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INTRODUCTION 
William & Mary Tax Conference 
November 10, 2017 
Resolving Identity Theft Issues1 
Presenters: Judge Diana Leyden 
Professor Keith Fogg 
Moderator: Craig Bell 
For the past decade, identity theft has been the leading form of consumer complaint to the Federal 
Trade Commission and a leading source of problems for the IRS. The term "identity theft" 
encompasses a wide range of activities where an individual's or a business' identifying information 
is misused for the benefit of the thief. Based on the most recent FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK, published in March of 2017, employment and tax-
related fraud were the most common form of identity theft, accounting for 34% of all reported 
cases. In 2016, tax-related identity theft comprised approximately 20% of the Taxpayer Advocate 
Service's case receipts.2 
The National Taxpayer Advocate first tagged identity theft as a most serious problem in her 2004 
annual report to Congress. The financial consequences of tax-related identity theft may include 
frozen or delayed refunds, loss of tax benefits, assessment of additional taxes, imposition of liens 
and levies to collect the incorrectly assessed taxes, and issues with non-tax benefits tied to 
income (such as housing or food stamps) due to attribution of additional income. Persons facing 
identity theft will experience a long path to clearing their identity and will face significant 
obstacles in gaining information about the theft. A Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration ("TIGTA") analysis of tax returns filed during the 2014 filing season revealed 
that the Service potentially paid out around $1.6 billion in fraudulent refunds attributable to 
undetected identity theft. 3 The initial attempts by the IRS to address identity theft were clumsy 
1 This outline draws heavily from Chapter 22, "Resolving Identity Theft in Tax Administration," of Effectively 
Representing Your Client Before the IRS, a publication of the ABA Tax Section. Keith Fogg is the editor of this 
book, and both Judge Leyden and Craig Bell have authored chapters in this book. The 71h edition of the book is 
forthcoming later this year. Special thanks to the authors of the chapter on identity theft since it first entered the 
book in 2011: Anna Barsegyan, Ariel Stephenson, Rachael Rubenstein, Paul Downey, Robert Wunderle, Vijay 
Raghavan and Susan Morgenstern. 
2 IRS, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, Vol. 1, 522, available at 
http://www. taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/media/default/documents/2-16-arc/arc 16_ vo1ume1. pdf. 
3 TIGT A, 2017-40-017, EFFORTS CONTINUE TO RESULT IN IMPROVED IDENTIFICATION OF FRAUDULENT TAX RETURNS 
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and uncoordinated; however, the news is not all bad. In recent years, the IRS has made 
significant strides to address this issue and to combat this type of fraud. 
A May 2012 report released by TIGTA reported that the IRS provided ineffective and untimely 
assistance to victims of identity theft.4 A follow-up audit, completed in 2015, revealed case 
resolution time still averaged 278 days.5 A January 2017 report released by the Government 
Accountability Office ("GAO") determined that the IRS had reduced the time an identity theft 
case was open, to an average of 106 days in 2016.6 A June 2017 report released by TIGTA found 
case closure time frames for identity theft refund cases had decreased to an average of 166 days_? 
The following chart illustrates the scope of the problem from 2010 through 2013. 
Identity Theft Incidents and Taxpayers Affected During CY 2010 Through CY 20138 
Calendar IRS-Identified Taxpayer-Initiated Total 
Year Incidents Taxpayers Incidents Taxpayers Incidents Taxpayers 
2010 338,753 201,376 101,828 69,142 440,581 270,518 
2011 1,014,884 553,730 110,750 87,322 1,125,634 641,052 
2012 1,508,375 985,843 277,491 233,365 1,785,866 1,219,208 
2013 2,542,488 2,106,932 376,996 309,841 2,919,484 2,416,773 
The volume of identity-theft incidents in IRS inventory peaked in calendar year 2013.9 It has 
dropped in each of the subsequent years. In 2016, the IRS statistics through September showed 
that it "stopped 787,000 confmned identity theft returns, totaling more than $4 billion", 
compared to 1.2 million returns worth approximately $7.2 billion for the same time period in 
2015. 10 
INVOLVING IDENTITY THEFT; HOWEVER, ACCURACY OF MEASURES NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 7 (Feb. 7, 2017). 
4 See TIGTA, 2012-40-050, MOST TAXPAYERS WHOSE IDENTITIES HAVE BEEN STOLEN TO COMMIT REFUND FRAUD 
DO NOT RECEIVE QUALITY CUSTOMER SERVICE 5, 8, 12-13 (May 3, 2012). 
5 TIGTA, 2015-40-024, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE DELAYS AND ERRORS IN RECEIVING 
REFUNDS 5 (Mar. 20, 2015). 
6 See GAO, 17-186, IRS IMPROVED TELEPHONE SERVICE BUT NEEDS TO BETTER ASSIST IDENTITY THEFT VICTIMS 
AND PREVENT RELEASE OF FRAUDULENT REFUNDS 23 (Jan. 31, 20 17). 
7 TIGTA, 2017-40-036, CENTRALIZATION OF IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM ASSISTANCE REDUCED CASE CLOSURE TIME 
FRAMESANDTAXACCOUNTERRORS 5 (June 6, 2017). 
8 TIGTA, 2015-40-024, supra note 5, at 2. 
9 Id. at 3. 
10 IRS, SECURITY SUMMIT PARTNERS EXPAND IDENTITY THEFT SAFEGUARDS FOR 2017 FILING SEASON, BUILD ON 
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What has IRS done to combat identity-theft? 
1) Increased criminal prosecutions 
2) Improved detection models 
3) Partnered with private and state actors to obtain better information11 
4) Obtained legislation pushing back time for payment of refund in EITC returns 12, moving 
up the due dates for payers' submission ofW-2, W-3, and 1099-MISC forms to January 
31st (effective in 2017)13 and providing access prisoner database14 
5) Promulgated regulations permitting the use of Truncated Taxpayer Identification 
Numbers (TTINs), where not prohibited by the Code, applicable regulations, or other 
official IRS guidance. 15 
In 2015, the IRS hosted the first security summit in an effort to bring together a broad coalition 
of players involved in defeating identity theft. 16 While the IRS had made significant progress, 
the problem remains a serious problem and identity thieves have not given up. The recent 
Equifax data breach exposing significant information about almost all American adults raises 
concerns for identity-theft efforts in the future. 17 To the extent that the IRS has made significant 
strides to resolve the issues caused by identity-theft over the past several years, it has done so by 
devoting resources to this issue at a time of significant strain on its overall resources due to 
dwindling budgets. It is difficult to measure the true cost of identity-theft because it has diverted 
20 16 SUCCESSES, https :/ /www .irs. gov /uac/newsroom/irs-security-summit -partners-expand-identity-theft -safeguards-
for-2017-filing -season-build-on-20 16-successes (last updated Nov. 3, 20 16). 
11 See, e.g., IRS, INDUSTRY, STATES TAKE NEW STEPS TOGETHER TO FIGHT IDENTITY THEFT, PROTECT TAXPAYERS, 
June 11, 2015, available at https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/irs-and-industry-and-states-take-new-steps-together-
to-fight-identity-theft-and-protect-taxpayers. 
12 Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of2015 ("PATH Act"), Pub. L. No. 114-113, Division Q, § 201(b) 
13 Id. at § 201. 
14 See, i.e., Keith Fogg, "Prisoners Filing Fraudulent Returns and the Efforts to Detect It," September 21, 2017, 
procedurallytaxing.com, http://procedurallytaxing.com/prisoners-filing-fraudulent-returns-and-the-efforts-to-detect-
it/ 
15 Reg. § 301.6109-4(b). 
16 2015 Security Summit: Protecting Taxpayers from Identity Theft Tax Refund Fraud, 3, available at 
https:/ /www.irs.gov/PUP/newsroom/20 15 %20Security%20Summit%20Report.pdf. 
17 Tim Maurer, The Big Takeaway from the Equifax Hack? Only You Can Protect Your Identity, Forbes (Sept. 12, 
2017,11:00 a.m.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timmaurer/2017/09/12/the-big-takeaway-from-the-
equifax-hack-only-you-can-protect-your-identity/#7325626b3ec7; Mauri Backman, Will the Equifax 
data breach impact your Social Security benefits?, USA Today (Sept. 15, 2017,9:48 a.m.), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2017/09/15/will-the-equifax-data-
breach-impact-your-social-security-benefits/105616332/; Seena Gressin, The Equifax Data Breach: What 
To Do, Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017 /09/equifax-data-
breach-what-do. 
3 
significant IRS resources from examination and collection to prevention and unwinding of the 
problems caused by the fraudulent activity. 
Tax Related Identity Theft 
Three main types of theft exist: 
1) Employment related- this type of identity theft occurs when individuals need 
identification in order to obtain employment. Usually, the individuals engaging in 
employment related theft seek to do so because they are undocumented. Using the social 
security number of someone else allows these individuals to work as employees. (While 
an undocumented person can file a tax return with an ITIN, the ITIN does not permit the 
person to work as an employee.) This type of theft does not generally seek to harm the 
true owner of the social security number ("SSN") but has the collateral effect of doing so. 
When the employer sends to the IRS the Form W-2 or Form 1099 information regarding 
the identity thief employee, the information ends up on the account of the true owner of 
the SSN and gets picked up by the IRS when it runs the Automated Underreporter (AUR) 
program. The true owner of the SSN then receives correspondence from the IRS asking 
about the failure to report the income and begins a lengthy joumey with the IRS to 
resolve the correct reporting of this income. 
This type of theft also has consequences for the thief if the thief later seeks to become 
documented and enter the path to citizenship or permanent residence. In order to obtain 
legal status in the United States, the thief needs to show compliance with the tax laws. 
This can result in an arduous effort to unwind the use of stolen identification in order to 
properly report the income. 
The issue has consequences beyond the IRS. Almost always this activity implicates 
Social Security records of eamings and other agencies as well. The victim, if a recipient 
of government benefits, can have those government benefits removed because of the 
reports issued to the IRS and the SSA showing additional income. The victim must go 
through a similar effort with the agencies providing the benefits to unwind the improper 
reporting of this income similar to the effort it must expend with the IRS. 
Victims who are low income are particularly vulnerable because they do not have 
resources and skills to address the problems raised by the additional income appearing on 
their records. Commonly, these individuals will fail to respond to the IRS or other 
agencies in a timely manner when notices are issued and as a result end up with a tax 
assessment which results in an offset of refunds, a notice of federal tax lien and other 
collection action or lose benefits critical to their well-being. 18 
18 Les Book, "TIGTA Report Shows-IRS Has a Long Way to Go on Employment Related Identity Theft," July 17, 
2017, http:/ /procedurall ytaxing.com/tigta-report -shows-irs-has-a-long-way-to-go-on -employment -related-identity-
theft/. 
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2) Refund related- this type of identity-theft seeks to use the victim's identity in order for 
the thief to obtain a refund to which they are not entitled. 19 This is the type of theft that 
breaches like the one at Equifax make much easier, though the data obtained in that 
breach could also be used for employment related identity-theft. Here the thief will use 
the taxpayer's identity to file a tax return claiming deductions or credits that result in a 
refund and steal money from the government. This type of theft frequently seeks to 
obtain refundable credits because those types of refunds do not require withholding 
credits on account with the IRS. 
The thief typically files early in the filing season in order to be the first return filed with 
that SSN. Later, when the true taxpayer files, the IRS will reject the return of the true 
taxpayer because it already has on file the return of the thief. The true taxpayer will take 
months unwinding the fraudulent transaction in order to get the IRS to accept the correct 
return. This will significantly delay the receipt of any refund by the true taxpayer as well 
as cause the true taxpayer, and the IRS, much effort to fix the problem. 
In the case of low income taxpayers, the return filed by the thief may be the only return 
filed because the true taxpayer does not have a filing requirement. In these 
circumstances, the detection of the fraud becomes more difficult for the IRS and for the 
victim. The victim may not know of the fraud until contacted by a third party notifying 
the true taxpayer of the loss of benefits as a result of the additional income. 20 In the case 
of an elderly taxpayer who may reside in a nursing home, the unwinding of the theft may 
fall upon family members seeking to assist the relative but unequipped to easily do so. 
While the primary problem created by refund-related identity theft is a direct loss of 
funds by the government to the thief, the collateral consequences to the true owner of the 
identity can mirror the problems created for the victim of employment-related identity 
theft. 
3) Business related- this type of identity theft occurs when someone creates, uses or 
attempts to use a business's identifying information without authorization to obtain tax 
benefits.21 This type of theft involves both active and closed business.22 The thief 
generally seeks to use the business identity in order to receive refundable business credits 
or to perpetuate individual identity theft. 23 Victims are often unaware that their identities 
19 I.R.M. 25.23.1.4.1. In order toe-file a fraudulent tax return and receive a refund based upon falsified income and 
withholding information, the thief only needs a victim's name, SSN (or other tax identification number), and date of 
birth. 
20 The decision of the IRS to suspend its program of preparing substitute for returns for taxpayers who do not file 
may cause a delay in the true taxpayer learning about the theft of their identification. See 
http://procedurallytaxing.com/automated-substitute-for-return-asfr-program-suspended/ and 
http://procedurallytaxing.com/follow-up-to-yesterdays-post-on-suspension-of-asfr-program/ 
21 I.R.M. 25.23.4.1. 
22 I.R.M 25.23.9.1. 
23 This type of theft does not typically involve undocumented workers because they can operate a business with an 
ITIN. So, the typical person engaging in business Identity theft does so specifically for the purpose of stealing from 
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have been compromised until they receive a notice or bill from the Service. Business-
related identity theft tends to be more complex and cross-functional in nature than 
individual identity theft. As with the theft of an individual's identity, this theft can create 
significant adverse consequences for the targeted business. The business could suffer 
damage to its reputation, direct financial loss, high cost of professional representation to 
rectify the situation and lost business opportunity for the time and effort needed to 
resolve the problem.24 
As the IRS has improved its pe1formance regarding refund identity theft, more thieves 
have turned to business related identity theft in order to stay ahead of the curve. 
IRS Structure for Addressing Identity Theft 
When the problem first attracted widespread attention ten years ago, the IRS created the Pdvacy, 
Information Protection, and Data Secudty Office, which, it renamed the Privacy, Government 
Liaison, and Disclosure ("PGLD") Office in 2011.25 The IRS created this office to oversee the use 
of Personally Identifiable Information ("PIT") and to find ways to maintain the security of this 
infmmation.26 Inside of PGLD, the IRS established the Office of Incident Management27 and the 
Office of Privacy Policy and Knowledge Management. 28 
In 2015, in an effort to provide consistent treatment to victims of tax-related identity theft,29 the 
Service created the Identity Theft Victim Assistance ("lTV A") Headquarters, a new headquarters 
operation affiliated with the Identity Protection Strategy and Oversight Program ("IPS0").30 
IPSO seeks to help taxpayers by providing victim assistance, outreach, and prevention of future 
identity theft. The IPSO Program has fifteen distinct responsibilities, including: responsibility for 
developing, defining, monitoring, and executing identity theft policies and procedures; reducing 
taxpayer burden and improving service options while addressing and resolving identity theft 
cases; and protecting revenue through increased vigilance at the point of return submission.31 
IPSO now fmmulates the guidelines that the IRS uses to handle identity theft cases. 
the taxpayer. 
24 See recent IRS release on "Information on Identity Theft for Business, Partnerships and Estate and Trusts" at 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/information-on-identity-theft-for-business-partnerships-and-estate-and-trusts; See 
also www.irs.gov/protectyourclients. 
25 TIGTA, 2012-40-050, supra note 4, at 3. 
26 See I.R.M. 10.5.1.2(3). 
27 I.R.M. 10.5.1.7 .12. 
28 I.R.M. 10.5.1.7.1. 
29 Tax-Related Identity Theft: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 114th Cong. (Aug. 26, 2015) (Written 
Testimony of The Honorable J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration). 
30 I.R.M. 25.23.1.3(4). 
31 I.R.M. 25.23.1.3.1(2). 
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The IRS has created a Technical Working Group to identify ways to assist victims, an Identity 
Theft Advisory Council ("IDTAC") through which it shares ideas on how to attack the problem of 
identity theft with other interested parties and an Identity Theft Executive Steering Committee 
("IDTESC") to provide oversight. Because of the scrutiny of this issue by Congress and the need for 
coordination with numerous other agencies, the IRS devotes much energy to this problem. 
Identity Protection Specialized Unit 
The Identity Protection Specialized Unit ("IPSU") was established in 2008 in Wage & Investment, 
Accounts Management, to provide individualized assistance to taxpayers who are, or may become, 
victims of identity theft. 32 IPSU was generally seen as a failure in its early years and has never 
lived up to the purpose for which it was originally intended which was to provide individualized 
assistance to victims by assigning a specific IRS employee to assist that person in resolving the 
problem. In 2015, IPSU was consolidated into the Identity Theft Victim Assistance ("IDTVA") 
Directorate. 33 IPSU quickly evolved into a place that did not resolve problems but rather monitors 
identity theft cases worked by other IRS functions. Practitioners generally found IPSU difficult to 
work with. The IRS thought that having a central point of contact for a taxpayer trying to work 
through an identity theft problem would be the most helpful and it might have been if that point of 
contact had the authority to and did actually work to fix the problem. In its role as a coordinator, 
IPSU never fulfilled the initial vision. 
Taxpayers may report identity theft affecting their tax accounts directly to IPSU by calling the 
identity theft hotline at (800) 908-4490. This number will connect taxpayers directly to an IPSU 
customer service representative who can provide general information and answer basic questions. 
Taxpayers may also self-report identity theft to IPSU before it has impacted their tax accounts. 34 
IPSU will then serve as an intake, referral, and liaison unit for other Service functions that 
ultimately work the case and make account adjustments.35 
Accounts Management 
The vast majority of identity theft cases get worked by the Accounts Management function, Six 
specialized groups within Accounts Management work identity theft cases.36 Starting in 2013 the 
IRS tried to get a jump start on fixing the problem created by refund identity theft. It created Form 
14039 Identity Theft Affidavit ("ITA"). This form seeks to treat signal to the IRS that it should treat 
the return filed by the true taxpayer as the real return and not as a duplicate filing as previously 
done. If the taxpayer attaches this affidavit to the return, Accounts Management should mark the 
32 TIGT A, 2016-40-003, IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED IN THE IDENTITY PROTECTION SPECIALIZED UNIT TO BETTER 
ASSIST VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT 1, 8-11 (Oct. 27, 2015). 
33 I.R.M. 25.23.1.3(5). · 
34 Id. at 1. 
35 See id.; see also I.R.M. 8.6.5.1.1(10). 
36 Id. 
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return with a specialized code and send it to one of the specialized groups within Accounts 
Management for immediate processing. 37 Adopting this procedure has significantly reduced the 
time it takes to fix the problem for the true taxpayer. 38 
Criminal Investigation 
The IRS created the Identity Theft Clearinghouse ("ITC") in 2012 within CI.39 As of March 2016, 
the Cleadnghouse had received over 10,750 identity theft leads since its inception.40 The IRS 
increased the number of offenses it authodzed special agents to investigate in relation to identity 
theft. The matters that special agents can now investigation in connection with identity theft 
include: forging endorsements on Treasury checks, theft of public money, fraud in connection with 
access devices, mail fraud, and wire fraud. Cijoined with the Department of Justice Tax Division 
to make these investigations a much higher priority and issued DOJ-Tax Directive 144, which 
delegates authority to the United States Attorney's Offices to authorize tax-related grand jury 
investigations, to file federal criminal complaints, and to apply for seizure wanants. 41 If an 
investigation covered by this directive goes forward, the U.S. Attorney must notify CI if it proceeds 
with a grand jury investigation so that the prosecution may take advantage of access to tax returns 
and return information under section 6103(h). Because of the limited resources in CI, making 
identity theft a high priority on its investigation list has led to a number of high profile criminal 
investigations in the past few years in this area where previously almost none existed. 
CI has developed the Identity Theft Victim Disclosure Waiver Process in an effort to aid state and 
local law enforcement agencies pursuing identity theft investigations.42 Generally, section 6103 
forbids the disclosure of tax returns and return information to third parties including state and local 
law enforcement. The Waiver Process allows victims of identity theft to authorize the release of 
tax information to the designated state or local law enforcement official conducting the 
investigation. Disclosure issues pervade the area of identity theft and this is just one example of 
how the IRS and victims might work around the disclosure issues presented by identity theft. This 
workaround does expose information about the victims and that can be a concern. More discussion 
37 See id. at 6. 
38TIGTA, 2015-40-024, supra note 5. 
39 Examining the Skyrocketing Problem of Identity Theft Related Tax Fraud at the IRS: Hearing before the Subcomm. 
on Gov't Operations of the H Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 113th Cong. 15-17 (Aug. 2, 2013) (Written 
Testimony of Daniel Welfel, Principal Deputy Commissioner, IRS). 
40 IRS, IRS'S TOP 10 IDENTITY THEFT PROSECUTIONS: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION CONTINUES EFFORTS TO HALT 
REFUND FRAUD, Mar. 21, 2016, available at https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/irss-top-10-identity-theft-
prosecutions-criminal-investigation-continues-efforts-to-halt-refund-fraud. 
41 DOJ-Tax, Dir. No. 144, Tempormy Delegation of Authority to Authorize Grand Jwy Investigations, Criminal 
Complaints, and Seizure Warrants for Certain Offenses Arising from Stolen Identity Refund Fraud, <j[!J[ 2, 4. 
42 Examining the Skyrocketing Problem of Identity Theft Related Tax Fraud at the IRS: Hearing before the Subcomm. 
on Gov't Operations of the H Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 113th Cong. 17 (Aug. 2, 2013) (Written 
Testimony of Daniel Welfel, Principal Deputy Commissioner, IRS). 
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of disclosure issues will be addressed infra. One area where the IRS could improve is in the pursuit 
of prisoners who seek refunds through identity theft. If it could leverage the resource of the parole 
boards with respect to these crimes, it could gain enforcement muscle without having to expend 
significant CI resources.43 
Over the past three fiscal years, CI has helped convict over 2,100 identity thieves.44 In fiscal year 
2016 alone, IRS Criminal Investigation enforcement efforts resulted in 613 prosecutions in which 
the thief was sentenced for a crime related to identity theft. 45 Of course, the devotion of this much 
CI resources to this problem comes at the expense of the prosecution of other tax crimes. Some 
people see the use of CI resources to pursue identity theft as a use that is not completely consistent 
with its mission; however, devoting this much effort to pursuing this crime can have a very positive 
impact on stopping the activity. Because some of the identity theft occurs offshore, it can present 
significant difficulties in reaching the perpetrators and bringing them to justice. 
Return Integrity and Correspondence Services 
Within the IRS, the Return Integrity and Correspondence Services ("RICS") function, which falls 
under the Wage & Investment ("W &I") Division, seeks to identify and stop refund-related identity 
theft before it occurs.46 If this function works correctly, it protects both individual taxpayers and 
the system as a whole. This function is critical to the overall integrity of the tax refund system. 
Each year, tens of thousands of attempts are made to breach the IRS system and find weaknesses 
to exploit that would result in significant refunds going to thieves. Within RICS, the Integrity and 
Verification Operations ("IV0")47 function supports the Service's pre-refund fraud detection and 
prevention efforts.48 The IVO strives to protect revenue by identifying potentially fraudulent tax 
returns, verifying the accuracy of reported income and withholding information, and stopping the 
refund of returns that do not meet specified criteria.49 If a tax return gets identified as meeting 
identity theft criteria, it is then routed to the IVO function's Taxpayer Protection Program 
43 See discussion in article cited in footnote 14, supra note 14. 
44 IRS, STATISTICALDATA-lDENTITY THEFT INVESTIGATIONS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/statistical-data-identity-theft-
investigations (last updated Oct. 12, 2016). 
45 !d. 
46 IRS, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, Vol. 1, 46, available at 
http://www. taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/20 15ARC/ ARC 15 _ Volumel.pdf. See also TIGT A, 
2016-40-006, IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO BETTER ENSURE THAT REFUNDS CLAIMED ON POTENTIALLY 
FRAUDULENTTAXRETURNSARENOTERRONEOUSLYRELEASED 1 (Nov. 12, 2015). 
47 IVO was formerly known as the Taxpayer Assurance Program under Accounts Management (AMTAP). In 2013, 
the Service moved AMTAP out of the Accounts Management function to RICS and renamed it as well. I.R.M. 
25.23.2.21.2(1) (Oct. 13, 2016). 
48 TIGTA, 2016-40-006, IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO BETTER ENSURE THAT REFUNDS CLAIMED ON 
POTENTIALLY FRAUDULENT TAX RETURNS ARE NOT ERRONEOUSLY RELEASED 1 (Nov. 12, 20 15). 
49 Id. at 2. 
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("TPP"). 50 
: 
This part of the effort against identity theft does not rely on reporting by an, individual victim but 
identification in the system of returns that should not be processed. The IRS, is constantly seeking 
to refine its filters to catch the bad returns at the outset. For example, it will no longer send 500 
refunds to the same address as it did several years ago. If the same address is used for refunds on 
more than a specified number of returns, the IRS filters will kick in and prevent the issuance of 
the refunds until further investigation can occur. 
Identity Theft Supporting Documentation 
For persons who find themselves the subject of identity theft or who suspect that they might be the 
subject of identity theft, the IRS has a process for them to use to alert the IRS. If the IRS did not 
catch the identity theft with its filters, it will begin to take action toward the true taxpayer that 
alerts the true taxpayer that something is amiss. The true taxpayer may first discover that her 
personal information has been compromised upon receipt of a CP2000 notice for a prior filing 
year. The notice will typically come as quite a surprise because it will contain income or other 
information of which the true taxpayer has no knowledge. The true taxpayer will wonder why the 
IRS has contacted them and sent incmTect information. By denying that she ever earned the 
income or lived in the state in which that income was earned, the true taxpayer begins the process 
of aie1ting the IRS. Because the IRS encounters some of the same claims in situations in which 
there has not been identity theft, it must carefully listen to the taxpayer and will require the taxpayer 
to provide documentation in support of their story. At this point, the true taxpayer in an identity 
theft case will feel particularly put upon because they must, in effect, prove a negative. 
Alternatively, a taxpayer may have her electronically filed return rejected by the Service, as an 
identity thief has already filed a return using that taxpayer's TIN. Upon notification by the 
taxpayer, the Service will flag the taxpayer's account with an identity theft indicatorY 
If the Service employee cannot properly determine the ownership of the SSN used on the 
potentially fraudulent return, then the employee may request that the taxpayer provide identity 
theft supporting documentation to verify that the taxpayer is the true holder of the TIN. 52 A driver's 
license, state I.D. card, passport, or Social Security card are acceptable as proof of identity. 53 In 
addition to these documents, the IRS requires that the taxpayer file some evidence of identity theft: 
either a police report or the IRS Form 14039 IRS Identity Theft Affidavit. 54 The Service requires 
that the taxpayer provide this documentation once per incident. The taxpayer provides this 
50 TIGTA, 2016-40-008, CONTINUED REFINEMENT OF THE RETURN REVIEW PROGRAM IDENTITY THEFT DETECTION 
MODELS IS NEEDED TO INCREASE DETECTION 2 (Dec. 11, 2015). 
51 The indicator is TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM. I.R.M. 25.23.2.16(1). 
52 I.R.M. 25.23.2.17(3). 
53 I.R.M. 25.23.2.17(1)(1). 
54 I.R.M. 25.23.2.17(1)(2). 
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information only one time when there may be multiple years in question, but all of which are 
investigated as a result of one incident. 55 
The information provided by the true taxpayer is valid for three years after the date that the Service 
receives the information from the taxpayer. 56 The IRS default position is that a once it has sent the 
taxpayer a proposed adjustment, the true taxpayer's failure to submit the documentation requested 
by the IRS indicates that the true taxpayer is not an identity theft victim. 57 While the position of 
the IRS concerning response to its notices is logical and necessary, the taxpayer finds themselves 
in a situation that demands immediate and significant attention. Not all taxpayers are equipped to 
adequately assist the IRS (and themselves) in fixing the problem. This puts a burden on the system 
and the taxpayer. 
Assuming that the taxpayer can timely submit the requested documents completely and legibly, 
the IRS will usually notify the taxpayer that it has classified the matter as one of identity theft and 
that it is working toward resolution of the problem. It will also notify the taxpayer that resolution 
may take six months.58 Once the IRS has reached the initial conclusion that identity theft occurred, 
it should update the taxpayer's account, if necessary, to accurately reflect the type of identity theft 
suspected. 59 When the IRS employee handling the case verifies that the person who provided the 
supporting documentation is a victim of identity theft and confirms that she is the owner of the 
SSN at issue, the employee should update the address associated with the true taxpayer and make 
sure that notices are not sent to the address of the perpetrator. 60 
When the IRS determines that identity theft occurs and adjusts the true taxpayer's account to reflect 
their correctly filed return or to remove income from the fraudulent return, it should notify the 
taxpayer. It generally includes in that correspondence the name of an employee at IPSU to contact 
if there are questions or continuing concerns. In a recent case at the Harvard clinic, I called this 
number on behalf of a client in order to verify that the account had been properly adjusted. The 
IPSU employee told me that she would not provide me with a copy of the client's account transcript 
and that I would need to obtain that transcript through ordinary channels. I pointed out to her that 
once the identity theft indicator is placed onto an account it cannot be obtained through e-Services 
55 I.R.M. 25.23.2.17(11). 
56 I.R.M. 25.23.2.17(10). 
57 I.R.M. 25.23.2.17(3). 
58 I.R.M. 25.23.2.10. 
59 Currently, there are five different Tax Administration Source Codes that the Service may apply: INCOME, 
MULTFL, INCMUL, NOFR, and OTHER.I.R.M. 25.23.2.17.3(3). The Service uses INCOME when income has been 
reported under the taxpayer's SSN without his consent or knowledge. Id. It uses MULTFL when two or more returns 
are filed for the same tax period under the same SSN. !d. If a combination of both income and improper returns are at 
issue, then the Service uses the INCMUL code. !d. If the issue arises out of an account for a taxpayer who normally 
does not have a filing requirement, then the Service codes the incident as NO FL. !d. Finally, if the matter does not fit 
into any of the tax administration codes, then the Service uses the OTHER code. Id. These codes are useful to the 
Service as they direct further investigation and research into the identity theft matter. 
60 I.R.M. 25.23.2.8. 
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or through calling the Practitioner Priodty Hotline. Nonetheless, the IPSU employee declined to 
provide an account transcript showing the conection of the account. With a few months the client 
received another notice from the IRS which made clear that the IRS had not cleared up the account. 
In order to resolve the issue, it became necessary to involve the Local Taxpayer Advocate. This 
is an example of the burden that identity theft places on the system and the taxpayer, as well as the 
failure of some of the IRS procedures to fully address the problem of identity theft. 
Identity Protection Personal Identification Number 
In an effort to prevent any further harm to victims of identity theft, the IRS can issue an Identity 
Protection Personal Identification Number (IP PIN) after the case is fully resolved. 61 IP PINs 
started as a pilot program in 2011. In 2014, the Service expanded the use of IP PINs to select 
taxpayers, not all of whom were victims of identity theft. 62 The IP PIN is pdmarily used to prevent 
electronic filing fraud, but may also be used on a paper return. IP PINs offer an additional level of 
security for the taxpayer who has been or fears becoming a victim of identity theft. If the IRS 
issues an IP PIN to a taxpayer, any tax return filed with the taxpayer's TIN without the IP PIN will 
not post to the taxpayer's account. 63 For the taxpayers' safety, the IRS issues new IP PINs each 
year in December for use in the coming filing season. In the event an IP PIN is lost or misplaced, 
the taxpayer can request a new one from the IRS but must go through proper authentication 
processes to ensure that the taxpayer is authorized to receive the IP PIN. 64 Because of rampant 
identity theft fraud in cettain parts of the country, the program was expanded in recent years to 
allow opt-in by taxpayers who reside in Georgia, Flodda, or the District of Columbia.65 Prior to 
the 2015 filing season, the Service sent notices to select groups of taxpayers identified as at dsk 
for possible identity theft, informing them that they may elect to receive an IP PIN for their own 
protection.66 Due to the recent information breach at Equifax, advocates have requested that the 
IRS consider making IP PINs available nationwide, but the IRS has rejected this proposal to date. 
Obtaining Taxpayer Information to Resolve Identity Theft Cases 
The disclosure laws generally protect a taxpayer's infotmation and prevent identity theft; however, 
61 I.R.M. 25.23.2.20. 
62 I.R.M. 25.23.2.20.2. 
63 I.R.M. 25.23.2.20(6). An IP PIN must be entered for all TIN that have a IP PIN requirement, regardless of whether 
the TIN belongs to the primary taxpayer, their spouse or their dependents, for electronically filed Form 1040 Individual 
Income Tax series, Form 2441 Child and Dependent Care Expenses and Schedule Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). 
I.R.M. 25.23.2.20(3). 
64 I.R.M. 25.23.2.20.1. 
65 IP PIN Pilot Continues in Georgia, Florida and the District of Columbia, https://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Identity-
Protection-PIN-Pilot-Program (last updated Feb. 11, 2017). Taxpayers may access the Service's IP PIN opt-in tool 
online. See Get An Identity Protection PIN (IP PIN), https://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Get-An-Identity-Protection-PIN 
(last updated Mar. 17, 20 17). 
66 Understanding Your CP01F Notice, https://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Understanding-Your-CP01-Notice (last 
updated Feb. 8, 2017). 
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when a taxpayer is the known victim of identity theft the IRS procedures can make it very difficult 
for the taxpayer to access their own information. In part, the issue stems from the IRS desire to 
provide extra protection for an account in which a thief possesses the kind of information that 
might, in ordinary circumstances, allow the thief access to the taxpayer's information at the IRS 
by having the ability to answer identifying questions. In part, the issue stems from the IRS duty 
to protect the fraudulent return of the thief which is not the return of the taxpayer. Threading the 
needle to provide taxpayer's necessary information while preventing further identity theft provides 
quite a challenge to the IRS. 
In confirmed or suspected cases of identity theft, the IRS marks a taxpayer's account with various 
types of identity theft indictors.67 When these markers exist, the practitioner will generally find it 
difficult to obtain any "return" or "return information" from the Service reported under a client's 
SSN because IRS employees are trained to be more cognizant in these cases about the potential 
for unauthorized disclosures of taxpayer information protected by section 6103.68 One approach 
that practitioners sometimes take when they have a client who they suspect is the victim of identity 
theft is to obtain all of the information on their client's account before disclosing to the IRS that 
the client is a victim of identity theft. Before the markers are on the account, the practitioner will 
usually experience little difficulty in accessing the information through the normal channels. 
On April 4, 2014, the IRS re-announced through its weekly e-News for tax professionals (April 
4th Notice) that it would no longer process or release requests for taxpayer transcripts through 
TDS when a taxpayer's account contained an identity theft indicator. 69 Presently, when a 
taxpayer's authorized representative attempts to pull a transcript through the TDS system on behalf 
of a victim (or Service suspected victim) of identity theft, the practitioner will receive a notice, 
which states, "[ w ]e apologize for the inconvenience but we are not able to process your request at 
this time. Please have your client contact the Identity Protection Specialized Unit (IPSU) at 800-
908-4490."70 The taxpayer then receives a paper copy in the mail of the same notice for every year 
and transcript type the representative attempted to get off TDS. 71 The notice also instructs tax 
professionals with a POA on file that they may contact IPSU to obtain client transcripts. 72 
As discussed above, a large part of the reluctance regarding whether to release taxpayer 
67 See I.R.M. 8.6.5.2(8); I.R.M. 25.23.2.15. 
68 See, e.g., I.R.M. 21.2.3.5.8. 
69 e-News for Tax Professionals, Issue Number: 2014-14. 
70 Letter from Patricia LaPosta, Director, Electronic Products & Services Support, IRS, to Taxpayer (name redacted) 
(Apr. 20, 2014) (on file with author, Rachael Rubenstein). 
'
71 See e-News for Tax Professionals, Issue Number: 2014-14. See also IRS: ID Theft Victims Can't Receive Transcripts 
Through Delivery System, DAILY TAX REP, (BNA), April4, 2014, at G-4. 
72 In practice, phone assistors who answer the toll-free IPSU line, as well as the practitioner priority service (PPS) 
line, seem unsure whether they are permitted to release various transcripts and other confidential information when 
the account contains any type of identity theft indicator. It is not uncommon for these calls to end with the practitioner 
unable to receive any requested information. 
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infotmation associated with identity theft turns on the issue of whose "return" or "return 
infmmation" is it: the taxpayer's or the return of the identity thief?73 While the IRS appears to 
recognize the need for identity theft victims and their representatives to have access to information 
in the taxpayer's account in order to properly address the issue, the Office of Chief Counsel has 
issued several, not always consistent, opinions concerning the legal interpretation of section 6103 
disclosure issues related to identity theft. 74 
Since first addressing the issue in a 2008 PMTA document, the Service's position has evolved to 
better assist victims but would really benefit from a statutory fix. Presently, the Service takes the 
position that once the invalid return is submitted, it becomes the return information of both the 
true owner of the SSN and the identity thief because the information relates to the potential 
investigation of liability with respect to both parties.75 Under this analysis, a victim of identity 
theft, and her designated representative, generally has a right to a copy of the bad tax return as 
long as disclosure would not impair federal tax administration. 76 If a criminal investigation, for 
example, is underway with respect to the fraudulent return, the true taxpayer could find themselves 
in a waiting game to get the information because the IRS does not want to release the information 
and possibly impair the investigation. 
The authority for the most recent opunon of Chief Counsel's Office that allows greater 
dissemination to the true taxpayer of the fraudulent return is found in section 6103(e)(7), which 
allows for disclosure of return infmmation to persons authorized to have access to the return of a 
taxpayer as long as disclosure would not "seriously impair federal tax administration.'m The new 
rationale is that while the identity thiefs return submission contains "return infmmation," it is not 
a valid "return" as contemplated by section 6103(b)(1) because it is "not ftled by the true taxpayer 
or with the taxpayer's consent."78 Because the true owner of the SSN did not sign the filed tax 
return, the return lacks a valid signature, as required by the Beard test. 79 The bad return also cannot 
73 See Disclosure Issues Related to Identity Theft, PMTA 2012-005, 3-4 (Jan. 18, 2012), available at 
https://www.irs.gov/publlanoa/pmta_2012-05.pdf. 
74 Id.; Identity Theft Returns and Disclosures Under Section 6103, PMTA 2009-024 (Jun. 8, 2008), available at 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta2009-024.pdf; Systematically Identified BMF Identity Theft, PMTA 2015-019 
(Aug. 7, 2015), available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa!PMTA-2015-19.pdf. 
75 PMTA 2012-005, supra note 70, at 3-4; PMTA 2015-019, supra note 71, at 6-7 (where the identity thief files a 
fraudulent return in the name of an otherwise legitimate business, the return information created and gathered as part 
of that fraudulent filing is the return information of the business victim; however, where the identity thief uses an 
individual victim's identity infmmation to obtain an EIN and/or file fraudulent tax returns for a fictitious business 
(other than a sole proprietorship), the information would not be the return information of the individual victim because 
the individual does not have liability under the Code). 
76 PMTA 2012-005, supra note 70, at 5-6. 
77 Id. at 5; I.R.C. § 6103(e)(7). The most recent Chief Counsel memorandum entitled "Identity Theft- Disclosure 
Issues under I.R.C. 6103" is dated July 8, 2016 and was released on August 25, 2017. It is labeled DISSP-138861-15 
and is copied in its entirety at the end of this outline. 
78 PMTA 2012-005, supra note 70, at 3; PMTA 2015-019, supra note 71, at 4-5. 
79 I d.; Under Beard v. Commissioner, the test to determine whether a document constitutes a valid return filing contains 
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be considered a valid return under the Beard test because it does not represent "an honest and 
reasonable attempt to comply with federal tax laws."80 Even though the bad return is treated as a 
nullity from the standpoint of its validity as a return, it does contain return information as defined 
by section 6103(b)(2) because it includes "information received, acquired, or generated by the 
Service in connection with the determination of a taxpayer's liability."81 Some of the opinions 
written about how or whether to allow the true taxpayer to see everything in their own account 
seem maddeningly complex because the Chief Counsel lawyers are struggling to deal with a statute 
that was not designed to address identity theft and because the consequences to an IRS employee 
of wrongful disclosure are severe. No one wants to see the case in which an identity thief 
successfully sues the IRS for a disclosure violation related to the turning over of information from 
the fraudulent return. 
In 2015, the IRS set out procedures allowing identity theft victims have access to important tax 
account information, including copies of fraudulent tax returns. 82 Through these procedures, 
identity theft victims can obtain a redacted copy of a fraudulent return that was filed and accepted 
by the Service using the identity theft victim's name and TIN. In order to comply with federal 
privacy laws, the Service requires that the victim's name and TIN be listed as either the primary 
or the secondary taxpayer on the fraudulent return. 83 If, for example, the fraudulent return lists the 
victim as a dependent, the Service will not release the fraudulent return information to her because 
she would not meet the test under the privacy laws as the IRS currently interprets them. The IRS 
will only do this if the case involves a Form 1040 Series tax return. Currently, it will not release 
business tax returns under this process. 84 
In order to request the return, the taxpayer or her representative must complete Form 4506-F, 
Request for Copy of Fraudulent Return. 85 The form must be mailed to the following address: 
IRS 
Fresno, CA 93888-002586 
four elements: "First, there must be sufficient data to calculate tax liability; second, the document must purport to be 
a return; third, there must be an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law; and fourth, 
the taxpayer must execute the return under penalties of perjury." Beard v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766, 777 (1984). 
80 PMTA 2012-005, supra note 70, at 3 (citing Beard, 82 T.C. at 777). 
81 Id. (citing Payne v. United States, 289 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also PMTA 2015-019, supra note 71, at 
6. 
82 See TIGTA, 2017-40-011, ACTIONS CAN BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE PROCESSES OF A NEWLY DEVELOPED PROGRAM 
THAT ENABLES VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT TO REQUEST COPIES OF FRAUDULENT TAX RETURNS 1 (Nov. 8, 2016); 
see also Instructions for Requesting Copy of Fraudulent Returns, https://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Instructions-for-
Requesting-Copy-of-Fraudulent-Returns (last updated Feb. 17, 2017). 
83 Instructions for Requesting Copy of Fraudulent Returns, supra note 79. 
84 Id. 
85 !d. Prior to October 1, 2016, the IRS had asked taxpayers send a letter providing similar information to Form 4506-
F, however the lack of a standardized form led to processing errors. See TIGTA, 2017-40-011, supra note 79, at 6. 
86 Returns being sent via private delivery service should instead be mailed to: IRS, 5045 East Butler Avenue, Fresno, 
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Refund Suits 
When the taxpayer has been the victim of refund related identity theft, the IRS is not making 
adequate progress towards resolution and the return of the taxpayer seeks a refund, the taxpayer 
can tum to the "normal" refund litigation process to seek an expedited review of the request for 
refund. If six months have passed since the taxpayer filed the return seeking a refund which is 
being held up while the IRS seeks to resolve the identity theft issue, the taxpayer can file suit. 
Before embarking on this route, the practitioner should make sure the client does not have other 
compliance issues with the Service or identity theft problems affecting other tax years, especially 
years in which a refund suit is not an appropriate remedy. Further, the case must involve a tax year 
(or years) where the victim has experienced true identity theft refund fraud, as opposed to a case 
where the taxpayer victim had her tax refund(s) offset due to collection issues resulting from prior 
year identity theft issues. If the taxpayer is low income, both courts offer petitioners the option of 
filing suit without paying the normal filing fee. At least one low income taxpayer clinic has had 
success in bringing refund suits as a method for forcing earlier resolution of refund identity theft 
and getting the refund to the client. 
Tax Court 
Victims of identity theft can most easily end up in Tax Court because they will receive a notice of 
deficiency based on their failure to report income earned by employment related identity theft or 
the claim of a deduction or credit in the case of business related identity theft. The thief may have 
used the taxpayer's address or the IRS has reviewed their records and found the victim's address. 
In that case, the IRS will send a notice of deficiency to the victim.· If the IRS does not send a 
notice of deficiency to the victim's last known address, the victim may whether challenge the 
notice of deficiency is valid. 
If the taxpayer receives the notice of deficiency either because it is sent to his or her last known 
address or he or she somehow gets a copy, before filing with the Tax Court, the victim may 
utilize Rev. Proc. 98-54 to ask the IRS to rescind the notice of deficiency and work to conect 
the account. Once the taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court, however, the IRS will not 
rescind the notice of deficiency. 87 
Once a petition is filed, the taxpayer should work with IRS counsel to try to resolve the case. The 
good news in a Tax Court case is that frequently taxpayers can use section 620l(d) to put the 
burden of proof on the IRS with respect to the income reported on the Form W-2 or Form 1099. 
This section came into the code in 1996 as a part of Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 legislation and 
piggybacks on the 5th Circuit decision in Portillo v. Commissioner, 932 F.2d 1128 (1991), holding 
that a "naked" Fom1 1099 reporting income to a taxpayer was insufficient to cause the taxpayer to 
have a deficiency. Section 620l(d) placed the burden of proof on the IRS if a taxpayer contests 
the validity of an information return and cooperates with the IRS during the examination phase of 
CA 93 727, "Identity Theft- Request for Fraudulent Return." Instructions for Requesting Copy of Fraudulent Returns, 
supra note 79. 
87 See Chief Counsel Memorandum CC;PA:06-MEAvmtine April9, 2012. 
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the case. The IRS must go out to the sender of the Form 1099 and verify the correctness of the 
information. For someone who is the victim of identity theft, this will generally result in a 
successful resolution of the case for the true taxpayer. 
Representatives should carefully review any proposed stipulations of settled issue or decision 
documents in settled Tax Court cases to see whether respondent may be trying to assert penalties 
that were not in the original notice of deficiency. To assert such penalties, such as late file or late 
pay, respondent is required to amend the answer to raise it and then has the burden of proof. 
If the victim did not file an original tax return and can now do so representative should consider 
whether spouses should or can join in a newly filed original return. 88 If the IRS allows a joint 
return to be filed, it will summarily assess the spouse who is not the victim. 
Other issues can present themselves in Tax Court when a taxpayer is the victim of identity theft. 
Practitioners should be alert to clients raising issues of concern about information in their case and 
use informal or formal discovery of the IRS to gain access to information in the IRS files that 
might shed light on the issue. 
Practical Tips 
Certain issues come up with enough frequency that there are some actions a practitioner with a 
client facing an identity theft issue can use to make the process smoother. The discussion here 
does not follow a specific order but rather offers random pieces of advice that might not occur in 
the order discussed here. 
1) If you suspect identity theft, get a POA, contact the IRS and obtain all of the taxpayer's 
transcripts (wage and income, tax return and account transcripts) for as many periods as 
you think will be needed in order to resolve the issue before you file the identity theft form 
with the IRS. Once you make it known to the IRS that your client is or may be a victim of 
identity theft and the indicators go onto their account, your ability to obtain the transcripts, 
which may be critical to piecing together what has happened may be significantly limited. 
2) Let your client know that fixing an identity theft case can take a long time. It is important 
· to provide the client with a picture of the length of the process in order to avoid significant 
frustration. 
3) If your client has filed a tax return seeking a refund and more than six months has passed 
with no action from the IRS on the refund and no action in sight, consider bringing a suit 
for refund as a means of moving the case. 89 
4) Check the client's credit reports to determine if the identity theft is limited to a tax problem. 
88 Camara v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. No. 13 (September 28, 2017) 
89 Rob Nassau, "Using a Refund suit to remedy identity theft ofreturn preparer fraud," March 16, 2017, 
procedurallytaxing.com, http://procedurallytaxing.com/using-a-refund-suit-to-remedy-identity-theft-of-retum-
preparer-fraud/. 
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Put a fraud indicator on the credit repmi to prevent further use by the thief of the taxpayer's 
identity. 
5) Obtain an IP PIN number for filing with future tax returns. 90 The IRS readily provides 
these numbers to individuals in certain states but not others. It will provide the IP PIN for 
someone who it recognizes as a victim of tax identity fraud. 91 
6) Go to your Local Taxpayer Advocate's office if you are having problems getting the IRS 
to assist you. Identity theft has been the biggest inventory issue for the Taxpayer Advocate 
Service for almost the past decade. The recent decline in cases has also resulted in a 
relatively dramatic decline in these cases in the TAS offices but because of their past 
experience these offices have a lot of expertise and are generally more accessible than the 
IPSU units which are remote and not as customer friendly. 
7) Expect the unexpected. One victim of identity theft had a fraudulent refund return filed on 
his behalf which resulted in the refund being offset as part of the federal offset program 
and the refund paid his outstanding student loan debt. Then as the IRS began to unwind 
that transaction more problems ensued for the taxpayer, the IRS, and probably the 
Department of Education.92 
8) Be aware that the additional income that could appear because of employment theft can 
have an impact on a client's benefits and be proactive about fmding the possible points of 
impact before the taxpayer loses benefits. 
9) Be alert to the possibility of identity theft when the client comes in complaining of IRS 
correspondence or collection action they cannot understand. Because many clients put 
their head in the sand regarding the IRS, it can be easy to become jaded about clients 
complaining about IRS correspondence. Sometimes these complaints have a legitimate 
basis due to the IRS pursuing the true taxpayer based on information in the system 
generated by a thief. An example can be an elder taxpayer who no longer has a filing 
requirement who suddenly finds the IRS seeking to collect based on income earned by a 
thief, followed by exam notices going to the thief's address and then the Collection division 
of the IRS locating the true taxpayer and demanding payment. 
10) Obtain multiple original copies of identity documents (perhaps 5-8), so the practitioner 
does not have to make copies of copied identity documents when later submitting multiple 
Identity Theft Affidavits (ITAs) to various Service functions. If the identity documents 
submitted along with the IT A are illegible the affidavit may not be accepted and, instead, 
90 https :/ /www .irs.gov/identity -theft -fraud-scams/ get-an-identity -protection-pin. The Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) had previously made available Identify Theft PINs for consumers in Florida, Georgia, and the 
District of Columbia, and consumers in those states should consider getting the pin (which they should do before 
getting a freeze). 
91 See Letter dated September 21, 2017 to Commissioner Koskinen from advocates seeking to expand the 
availability of IP Pins after the Equifax data breach, https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/credit_reports/irs-lttr-re-efx-
breach.pdf. 
92 Ivy v. IRS, 197 F.Supp.3d 139 (D.D.C. 2016). An appeal was filed on August 24, 2016 to the D.C. Circuit. 
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returned. 
11) Obtain proof of identity theft from the taxpayer. At a minimum, the practitioner will need 
documents sufficient to satisfy the Service's substantiation requirements, a copy of a police 
report or a completed ITA, and a copy of a valid U.S. federal or state government issued 
form of identification. 93 If the taxpayer possesses multiple types of identity documents, it's 
preferable to obtain copies of whatever the taxpayer can produce. Examples of acceptable 
identity documents include: passport, driver's license, and Social Security Card. A birth 
certificate may be helpful as a secondary form of identification, but it cannot be the only 
document used to establish identity. 
12) Soon after the detailed interview with the taxpayer, the practitioner should memorialize a 
specific yet concise version of the client's story in the narrative section of the ITA. The 
ITA should be completed with the taxpayer. Finally, several (perhaps 5-8) original copies 
of the ITA should be printed, reviewed, and signed. There is a good chance the practitioner 
may need to use this form to prove the client's identity to several Service functions where 
the identity theft has negatively impacted the client's tax accounts for various tax years. 
13) If the true taxpayer has not already visited a police station to report the identity theft, the 
practitioner should exercise caution when recommending that the client make an in person 
police report due to the potential for outstanding arrest warrants as a result of the actions 
by the thief. At a minimum, the client should be advised about a possible arrest when 
visiting a police station if a warrant exists under her identity. 
14) Consider checking the taxpayer's earnings history from the SSA both to obtain an 
independent source of the taxpayer's earnings and to check with SSA to make sure that 
nothing the thiefhas done will adversely impact the taxpayer's SSA account. 
Conclusion 
The IRS has come a long way over the past decade to improve its system of dealing with victims 
of identity theft. The numbers of cases have declined significantly but still remain large in absolute 
terms. Clients will feel especially put upon in paying for representation in these cases because 
they are the victim. They will want quick resolution of a problem that will not usually go away 
quickly. Understanding the IRS systems for approaching identity theft, familiarizing yourself with 
the disclosure issues presented, and quickly pursuing the available avenues for resolution will keep 
your client from suffering more than necessary, but nothing will prevent them from significant 
pain once someone has stolen their identity and used it in a way that implicates the IRS. 
93 I.R.M. 25.23.2.17. Under the I.R.M., only one copy of a valid U.S. federal or state government issued form of 
identification must be sent along with the IRS ITA. I d. 
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Internal Revenue Service 
Memorandum 
Number: AM2017-004 
Release Date: 8/25/2017 
CC:PA:?:JEGerdyZogby DISSP-138861-15 
UILC: 6103.00-00 
date: July 08, 2016 
to: Joanne B. Minsky 
Division Counsel (Wage & Investment) 
from: Drita Tonuzi /s/ 
Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure & Administration) 
subject: Identity Theft- Disclosure Issues under I.R.C. § 6103 
Several offices have requested assistance in determining which disclosures are 
appropriate in the identity theft context. This memorandum consolidates previous 
legal advice94 with regard to disclosure issues under section 6103 in cases 
involving identity theft. 
Although this memorandum provides a broad overview of identity theft disclosure 
issues in the context of identity theft, it does not purport to discuss or provide 
formal legal guidance with respect to all potential identity theft factual scenarios 
that could exist. The discussion below represents scenarios that have previously 
been provided and analyzed, but identity theft scenarios are constantly evolving. 
The legal analysis involved in identity theft disclosure issues can vary significantly 
based on any number of factual details, such as where the victim's information 
appears on a particular filing and the context in which a return was filed with the 
Service. Thus it is recommended that all novel identity theft disclosure issues be 
referred to P&A for legal review and advice. 
The advice in this memorandum only applies to certain situations in which 
identity theft is an issue. Applying this advice in non-identity theft contexts 
94 
"Systematically Identified BMF Identity Theft," August 7, 2015, PMTA-2015-19, available at 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/PMT A-2015-19.pdf; "Disclosure Issues Related to Identity 
Theft," Jan. 18, 2012, PMTA 2012-05, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta 2012-
05.pdf (issued by Cl based on P&A's research and analysis); "Identity Theft Returns and 
Disclosures Under Section 61 03," June 8, 2008, PMT A 2009-024, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta2009-024.pdf. 
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could result in an unauthorized disclosure and possible civil and criminal 
penalties under I.R.C. §§ 7431 and 7213. 
ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. Is a return filed by an identity thief protected under section 61 03? 
• Some identity theft "returns" are not returns for 6103 purposes. 
• Identity theft "returns" are "return information" protected under section 
6103. 
2. Whose return information is it? 
• A fraudulent refund return is the return information of both the victim 
and the thief from the moment it is filed with the Service. 
• If a victim is listed as a dependent on a fraudulent return, the return is 
not the return information of the victim. 
• For returns filed by an employer, the return information is generally the 
employer's, the employee's, and the victim's. 
• A return filed using a fraudulent EIN, which was obtained using a 
stolen SSN, is not the return information of the victim. 
3. Who may receive the disclosure? 
• The Service may disclose a taxpayer's return information to the 
taxpayer, but an identity thief is not necessarily a taxpayer. 
• A taxpayer may consent to the disclosure of his or her own return 
information. 
• The Service is not authorized to disclose the identity thief's separate 
and distinct return information to an identity theft victim. 
• The Service is authorized to disclose return information to other 
employees of the Department of the Treasury. 
• The Service is authorized to disclose return information in a Federal or 
State judicial or administrative tax proceeding. 
• Legal guardians of minor victims may obtain copies of the minor 
victim's return information. 
• In some circumstances, the Service may disclose return information, 
but not "taxpayer return information," to other Federal agencies. 
• The Service may only disclose return information to state and local 
officials if they are considered Federal employees for section 6103 
purposes. 
• The Service may disclose information to confirm a return's legitimacy. 
4. To what extent may impairment of tax administration be considered in making 
a disclosure determination? 
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• 
• 
Information from an identity theft return should not be disclosed if that 
information would seriously impair Federal tax administration. 
Victims may obtain copies of fraudulent returns . 
DISCUSSION OF AUTHORITIES 
I. BACKGROUND 
In recent years identity theft and other refund fraud schemes have proliferated 
across the country. In response, the Department of Justice created an Identity 
Theft Task Force ("ITTF"), which is comprised of Federal agencies including the 
Service, the Postal Service, the Secret Service, and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, as well as state and local law enforcement. 
Identity theft can take many forms, but there are some common scenarios that 
typically confront the Service. The first is refund fraud, in which the perpetrator 
who has stolen an identity files a tax "return" early in the filing season using a 
Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, in the name or with the taxpayer 
identification number ("TIN"),~. Social Security Number ("SSN") or Employer 
Identification Number ("EIN"), of the victim, who has not yet filed a return for the 
tax year. For example, the perpetrator will often attach to the Form 1040 one or 
more false Forms W-2 showing bogus wages and withholding credits that exceed 
the wages, thereby providing the basis for the purported refund. The Form will 
also instruct that the refund be directly deposited into a bank account under the 
perpetrator's control. When the identity theft victim later files a legitimate return 
for the tax year, the Service will likely flag it because of the significant 
discrepancies with the prior filed return and, pending resolution, freeze any refund 
claimed on the second return. Eventually, through investigation, the identity theft 
and the fraud will become apparent. A variation of this scenario involves filing 
return forms in the name of a business to claim a fraudulent refund. In other 
situations, an identity thief uses another taxpayer's information to claim that 
taxpayer as a dependent in order to create additional deductions. 
In another common scenario, an undocumented worker, who does not have the 
legal status to work in the United States, uses the victim's stolen SSN to appear 
workeligible. The undocumented worker provides the SSN to the worker's 
employer, and the employer in turn files a Form W-2 reporting the worker's wages 
and tax withholding under the SSN provided. The undocumented worker then 
files a return, along with Form W-2, that, between the two forms, reflect the 
identity theft victim's SSN and name along with the actual wages and tax withheld 
of the undocumented worker. In processing the return, the Service may attribute 
the wages to the identity theft victim and determine additional tax due. Another 
variation on this scenario would involve the undocumented worker utilizing the 
victim's SSN on the Form W-2, but would vary in that the return would contain the 
Individual Taxpayer Identification Number ("ITIN"), along with the actual wages 
and tax withheld, of the undocumented worker, and the only information of the 
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victim would be the SSN on the Form W-2 submitted with the return. In this 
variation, there are no tax consequences to the victim as the wages are not 
attributed to the victim, but, nonetheless, the victim's account is marked with an 
indicator of employment-related identity theft. 
When the Service confronts identity theft and refund fraud, complex disclosure 
questions often arise. The determination of whether to release certain 
information depends on numerous factors, including what kind of return 
information is involved, whose return information it is, and who would receive the 
information in a disclosure. 
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. DISCLOSURES GENERALLY 
Section 61 03(a) provides that "returns" and "return information" are confidential 
and shall not be disclosed except as authorized in section 6103 or elsewhere in 
Title 26. Section 6103(b)(1) defines "return" to mean any tax or information · 
return, declaration of estimated tax, or claim for refund required by, or provided 
for that is filed with the Secretary, on behalf of, or with respect to any person, and 
any amendment and supplement thereto, including supporting schedules and 
attachments to the return. The term "return information" is broad and includes 
any information "received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected 
by" the Service with regard to a taxpayer's liability under the Code. See I.R.C. § 
6103(b)(2)(A); McQueen v. United States, 264 F.Supp.2d 502, 516 (S.D. Tex. 
2003), aff'd, 100 F. App'x 964 (5th Cir. 2004); LaRouche 
v. Dep't of Treasury, 112 F.Supp.2d 48, 54 (D.O. D. 2000); Hull v. IRS, 656 F.3d 
1174, 1195-96 (1Oth Cir. 2011 ). 
There is a subset of return information known as "taxpayer return information" 
that is subject to additional restrictions. Taxpayer return information is "return 
information ... which is filed with, or furnished to," the Service "by or on behalf of 
the taxpayer to whom such return information relates." I.R.C. § 6103(b)(3). In 
other words, taxpayer return information is return information provided by the 
taxpayer himself. Taxpayer return information enjoys special protections and is 
particularly relevant when determining whether information may be disclosed to 
other Federal agencies for nontax crimes, as discussed later in this 
memorandum. 
Taxpayers generally may access their own return information under section 
6103(e). See Linsteadt v. IRS, 729 F.2d 998, 1000 (5th Cir. 1984). For example, 
an individual has a right to view his or her own return under section 
61 03(e)(1 )(A)(i), and section 61 03(e)(1 )(C) generally95 allows any member of a 
partnership during the period covered by the return to receive disclosure of the 
95 I.R.C. § 6103(e)(10) imposes significant limitations. 
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return information of that partnership. 96 The Service must withhold return 
information if disclosing such information would "seriously impair Federal tax 
administration." I.R.C. § 61 03(e)(7). 
Although taxpayers generally may access their own return information, 
access to the return information of others is strictly limited. The Service may 
disclose the return or return information for a particular taxpayer to anyone whom 
the taxpayer may 
designate. I.R.C. § 61 03(c). In other words, a taxpayer may consent to the 
release of that taxpayer's own return information to a third party. 
The Service may disclose certain information under section 61 03(k)(6) when the 
Service is attempting to gather information that is otherwise not reasonably 
available in connection with a tax investigation. Treas. Reg. § 301.61 03(k)(6)-
1 (a)(1) allows a Service employee to disclose return information to the extent the 
disclosure is necessary to obtain information related to official duties. Additional 
exceptions may also allow for disclosure,~. disclosure to state tax officials, 
state and local law enforcement agencies, and disclosure to certain Federal 
officers and employees for purposes of tax administration. I.R.C. § 61 03(d) and 
(h). 
To determine to whom an item of return information "belongs," a critical issue is 
the identity of the person or entity with respect to whose liability the information 
was generated or received by the Service. Martin v. IRS, 857 F.2d 722, 724 
(1Oth Cir. 1988). The determining factor is whether the information relates to the 
Service's investigation or determination of another taxpayer's liability . .!Q.,_at 724. 
In certain circumstances, material can constitute the return information of more 
than one taxpayer. Solargistic Corp. v. United States, 921 F.2d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 
1991 ). If a taxpayer requests access to a record with return information of more 
than one taxpayer, the Service must not release any return information that does 
not "belong" to that taxpayer unless an exception to section 6103 protection 
applies. 
In the context of identity theft, various factors must be considered before 
determining whether returns and return information may be disclosed. 
B. IS A RETURN FILED BY AN IDENTITY THIEF PROTECTED 
UNDER SECTION 61 03? 
To determine whether something filed with the Service by an identity thief is 
protected from disclosure, the Service must first determine if the record is 
covered under section 6103. Since most documents filed with the Service by 
96 Additional information about disclosure to persons having material interest in the return 
information of different types of taxpayers may be found at section 61 03(e). 
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identity thieves are on return forms, the Service must determine if the document 
filed by an identity thief is a return under section 6103. 
1. Some identity theft "returns" are not returns for 6103 purposes. 
If a Form 1040 or other return form is not a valid return, the document itself does 
not qualify for disclosure protections under section 6103. See "Identity Theft 
Returns and Disclosures Under Section 6103," June 8, 2008, PMTA 2009-024, 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta2009-024.pdf; Zellerbach Paper 
Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 172, 180 (1934). An invalid return is not "required by, 
or provided for or permitted under" the Code, as described in section 6103(b)(1), 
so if a document is not a valid return, it may not be afforded disclosure protection 
under section 6103. 
Requirements for a valid return include that the return be filed as part of an 
honest and reasonable attempt to comply with the tax laws and that the return be 
signed by the purported taxpayer under the penalties of perjury. See Beard v. 
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766, 777(1984) (listing the requirements for a filing to be a 
valid tax return). A return form that is filed by an identity thief using a victim's 
name and TIN and attempts to intercept the victim's refund is generally not a valid 
return and therefore is not afforded protection under section 61 03(b)(1 ). 
The method through which the identity thief obtains stolen information likely will 
not make a difference in whether the document is a valid return. For example, if 
an identity thief steals the EIN of a company to file a fraudulent return and take 
the company's refund, the return is invalid. If, instead, the identity thief steals an 
SSN and then applies for an EIN under that stolen name, the return form filed 
using that fake EIN is still invalid because it was not filed as part of an honest and 
reasonable attempt to comply with the tax laws and is not signed by the person in 
whose name the purported return is filed. The form of the fraud, at least in this 
case, does not matter for the determination of whether the return is valid. 97 
Note that this rule does not apply in the case of an undocumented worker who 
uses a stolen SSN, but otherwise reports actual wages. This would be a valid 
return because, under the circumstances, it represents a reasonable effort to 
comply with the tax laws. 
To illustrate this rule, there is a legal difference between a Form 1040 filed by an 
identity thief and a Form W-2 filed by an employer using a stolen SSN. The 
employer is filing the W-2 in order to comply with employment tax responsibilities, 
and although there are penalties for filing information returns with missing or 
incorrect information under section 6721, this Form W-2 is not a sham return like 
a fictitious refund return. The form reflects a real employment relationship with 
associated wage payments and tax withholding and is filed as a good-faith 
97 The form of the fraud does matter for determining whose return information the return is, as 
discussed below. 
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information return. Unlike a Form 1040 from an identity thief reporting a phony 
set of facts, the Form W-2 in this scenario is not a fiction, and though potentially 
subject to a penalty, the Form W-2 would still constitute a valid return. As a result 
it is a return as defined in section 6103 as well. 
2. Identity theft "returns" are "return information" protected under section 6103. 
Although the return of an identity thief seeking a fraudulent refund is a nullity, the 
return may be legally protected "return information" under the broad definition of 
return information in section 61 03(b)(2)(A). The document is return information 
because it is "received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by" 
the Service as part of a determination of liability, or potential liability under the 
Code. I.R.C. § 61 03(b)(2)(A). 
Assuming there is some potential liability to be determined under the Code, the 
document does qualify as return information, and it can only be disclosed as 
authorized by the Code. I.R.C. § 61 03(a). By knowingly filing a false return, the 
identity thief subjects himself to possible other liabilities (~, under section 
7207), and any information furnished to and received by the Service with respect 
to the "determination of the existence, or possible existence of liability of [the 
identity thief] for an offense under the Code" is return information. See, ~' 
O'Connor v. IRS, 698 F. Supp. 204, 206 (D. Nev. 1988), aff'd without op., 935 
F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1991) (a threat against a Service employee is a violation of 
section 7212 and information collected with respect to that offense is return 
information). Thus, any information collected by the Service with regard to the 
identity thief's potential liability would be the return information of the identity thief. 
C. WHOSE RETURN INFORMATION IS IT? 
In the enactment of, and subsequent amendments to section 6103, Congress did 
not expressly provide for the situation in which one individual files a fraudulent 
return using the name or TIN of another taxpayer. As noted above, in 
determining to whom a particular item of return information belongs, the Service 
considers the identity of the person or entity with respect to whose liability the 
information was generated or received by the Service. Martin, supra at 724. 
In certain circumstances, a particular item may be return information of more than 
one taxpayer. Solargistic, supra. Return information related to identity theft is 
often the return information of both the victim and the thief. To determine whether 
section 6103 allows for disclosure of returns or return information, the Service 
must determine the "owner'' of the return or return information. 
1 . A fraudulent refund return is the return information of the victim and the 
thief from the moment it is filed with the Service. 
When a fraudulent refund return is first filed with the Service, the Service will 
assume it is the return information of the victim, since the victim's identifying 
information is on the return. Information such as the date the return was filed, the 
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document locator number assigned to it, the liability and payment amounts 
reported on the return, and the steps taken to process the return (including any 
refund) will all be posted to the victim's account for that taxable year. All this 
information was collected by the Service with respect to the possible tax liability of 
the victim, making that information the victim's return information. Section 6103 
does not incorporate any temporal limit on the designation or identification of 
returns and return information of being that of a particular taxpayer, so the return 
would remain the return information of the victim.98 
At the same time, as discussed above, the identity thief, by knowingly filing a 
false return, subjects himself to other possible liabilities, so the return is the thief's 
return information as well. See, g&_, O'Connor, supra. As a result, the return 
filed in an identity theft scenario is often the return information of both the victim 
and the thief. Even though the Service may not be aware that the return or return 
information belongs to the thief until the identity theft is discovered, it is still the 
return information of the identity thief from the moment it is filed with the Service. 
2. If a victim is listed as a dependent on a fraudulent return, the return is not 
the return information of the victim. 
In one variation of the identity theft scenarios, the identity thief claims the victim 
as a dependent for fraudulent refund purposes. Being claimed as a dependent 
could affect the determination of the victim's liability, specifically with regard to 
what deductions the victim could take (e.g., I.R.C. § 63(c)(5) (limiting the standard 
deduction for dependents); I.R.C. § 151 (b) (limiting the personal exemption for 
dependents). The document, however, would not be the return information of the 
victim listed as a dependent on the fraudulent return because being listed as a 
dependent on a tax return does not, in and of itself, subject the dependent to any 
liability under the Code. 
It should be noted, however, that the Service could examine a victim's return 
because the Service noticed that the victim was taking certain deductions. If the 
Service is determining the allowance or denial of deductions based on the 
conflicting information contained in the return filed by the identity thief, it is 
possible that the identity thief's return information could become germane to the 
determination of the victim's liability. In that case, the portion of the return that 
would be relevant to the victim's liability could be disclosed under section 
61 03(h)(4), which allows disclosures related to judicial or tax administration 
proceedings. The Service should redact any information that the victim is not 
98 Even if the Service were to confirm the "bad return" as fraudulent before it is processed and 
take no action with respect to the victim's account, the submission of a purported return 
bearing the victim's name and/or SSN, and the unsuccessful attempt to affect the victim's tax 
account by means of a "bad return" in 
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entitled to or that might seriously harm tax administration, as discussed below, 
before disclosing that information to the victim. 6 
3. For returns filed by an employer, the return information is generally the 
employer's, the employee's, and the victim's. 
The type of return may also be relevant to determining the "owner" of the return 
information. For example, when an employer files a Form W-2 with the Service, 
the information contained in that return is return information both of the employer 
and the employee. As a result, in the case of an undocumented worker using 
someone else's SSN, the return information belongs to the 
employee/undocumented worker, to the employer, and to the victim, based on the 
analysis above. 
the victim's name or TIN would nevertheless constitute the victim's return 
information just as if it were processed. 
6 See the discussion below, under "Other Considerations," for information on how 
a victim can request a copy of a fraudulent return even if he or she is not involved 
in a judicial or tax administration proceeding. 
4. A return filed using a fraudulent EIN, which was obtained using a stolen 
SSN, is not the return information of the victim. 
If an identity thief steals an EIN and files a fraudulent return for a business, that 
return is the return information of both the identity thief and the business victim. 
If, however, the identity thief steals an SSN, applies for an EIN using that SSN, 
and then files a fraudulent return for the EIN, then the return is not the return 
information of the individual victim because the fraudulent return is not related to 
the liability of the individual. Simply being listed on the application for an EIN 
does not in and of itself create a tax liability. As a result, that information may 
only be disclosed to the victim if otherwise authorized under Title 26. 
D. WHO MAY RECEIVE THE DISCLOSURE? 
The Service must determine to whom any return information would be disclosed 
before releasing that information because the exceptions to section 6103 are 
often based on who is receiving the disclosure. For example, the Service may 
disclose to a taxpayer his or her own returns or return information, but the Service 
is limited in who else may receive disclosures. 
1 . The Service may disclose a taxpayer's return information to the taxpayer, 
but an identity thief is not necessarily a taxpayer. 
Section 61 03(e)(1 )(A)(i) and (7) authorize the Service to release returns and 
return information of any taxpayer to the taxpayer himself. As a result, if 
information related to an identity theft return is the victim's return information, the 
Service may disclose that information to the victim. Additionally, an 
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undocumented worker's return or return information may be disclosed to the 
worker. 
There is an argument, however, that a refund fraud identity thief must 
demonstrate that he is a taxpayer before the Service can disclose return 
information to him as the taxpayer under section 61 03(e)(7). Section 7701 (a)(14) 
defines the term "taxpayer" as "any person subject to any internal revenue tax." 
An identity thief generally has not filed the fraudulent return because he is subject 
to some internal revenue tax. Unless the identity thief can demonstrate that he is 
subject to an internal revenue tax, the identity thief is not entitled to his return 
information.99 
2. A taxpayer can consent to the disclosure of his own return information. 
Although a taxpayer may generally have access to his own return information, 
access to another taxpayer's return information is limited. Section 6103(c) allows 
for a taxpayer to consent to the disclosure of returns or return information. A 
victim of identity theft may wish to have a copy of a fraudulent return sent to state 
or local authorities or another designee, and if the victim consents to the release 
of his return information, the Service may disclose that information to the victim's 
designee.100 Once again, the refund fraud identity thief must demonstrate that he 
is a taxpayer before he may take advantage of section 6103(c). 
3. The Setvice is not authorized to disclose the identity thief's separate and 
distinct return information to an identity thief victim. 
The Code provides no authority for disclosure of an identity thief's separate and 
distinct return information to an identity theft victim. The victim is not even entitled 
to disclosure of the identity thief's identity. Cf. Hodge v. IRS, 2003 WL 22327940 
(D.D.C. 2003) (the name and address of a person who used plaintiff's social 
security number on her tax return was third party return information that could not 
be disclosed to the plaintiff). However, where the information is the return 
information of both the victim and the thief, the Service may legally disclose the 
information to the victim. The Service, however, may conclude as a matter of 
policy that disclosure of return information of the thief to the victim will impair tax 
administration and accordingly refuse to make such disclosures. See I.R.C. § 
61 03(e)(7). 
99 Most identity thieves would not request return information, and the specific facts in any such 
scenario will be relevant in determining whether to release the return information to the 
identity thief. 
100 See the discussion below, under "Impairment and Policy Considerations," for information 
on how a victim can request a copy of a fraudulent return. 
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It should be noted, however, that the SeNice now allows victims to obtain 
redacted versions of identity thieves' returns. The method for obtaining such a 
return is discussed below. 
4. The Service is authorized to disclose return information to other 
employees of the Department of the Treasury. 
Since more than one SeNice operating division may be working on either the 
victim's or the identity thief's case, employees may need to share return 
information in the performance of tax administration duties. See I.R.C. § 
61 03(h)(1 ). Internal sharing of documents does not, however, mean that the 
shared information becomes return information of another taxpayer. If 
information from one case is copied and placed in other case files, it should 
clearly be labeled as third-party return information. 
5. The Service is authorized to disclose return information in a Federal or 
State judicial or administrative tax proceeding. 
Section 6103(h)(4) allows the disclosure of a taxpayer's return information to a 
third party if the disclosure meets one of four tests. 101 For example, in the case of 
a victim who was claimed as a dependent on a fraudulent refund return, the 
victim's own liability may be at issue in an examination. Section 6103(h)(4) would 
authorize disclosing the relevant portion of the fraudulent refund return in order to 
resolve the examination of the victim's liability. The fraudulent refund return is not 
the victim's return information, but the SeNice can disclose it to the victim. 
6. Legal guardians of minor victims may obtain copies of the minor victim's 
return information. 
Section 61 03(e)(2) provides that if an individual is legally incompetent, the 
individual's return or return information may be disclosed to the "committee, 
trustee, or guardian of his estate." In this regard, a minor is legally incompetent 
and this provision allows parents to access the return or return information of a 
minor if, under state law, the parent is the legal guardian of the minor's estate. 
See IRM 11.3.2.4.1 0; IRS Publication 4639, Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference 
Guide at 2-14 (rev. 10-2012). As a result, the parent may only request the 
minor's return information if that parent is the legal guardian under state law. 
Once it is clear that a parent may request the return information of the minor, the 
SeNice must then analyze what portions, if any, of the identity theft return would 
be considered the return information of the minor. For example, if the minor were 
listed as a dependent on a fraudulent return, that information would not generally 
101 Section 61 03(h)(4) authorizes disclosure of returns and return information in a tax 
proceeding (1) if either the taxpayer is a party to the proceeding or the proceeding arose out 
of or in connection with determining the taxpayer's liability or collection of taxes owed by the 
taxpayer under the Code; (2) if the 
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be the minor's return information. If, however, the minor were listed as the 
primary or secondary taxpayer on the return, then that return would be the return 
information of the minor because it was collected by the Service as part of a 
determination of the minor child's liability under the Code. It might also be the 
return information of the parent since, under section 6201 (c), an unpaid 
assessment against a minor is also considered to be an unpaid assessment 
against the parent, to the extent the assessment is based on compensation for 
the minor's services. 
7. In some circumstances, the Service may disclose return information, but 
not "taxpayer return information," to other Federal agencies. 
There are offenses related to identity theft that are not related to tax 
administration. Section 61 03(h) does not provide the ability to disclose return 
information to other Federal agencies for nontax crimes. 
Section 61 03(i)(3)(A), however, does provide limited authority for the Service to 
make proactive disclosures of return information, other than taxpayer return 
information, 
treatment of an item on the third party's return is directly related to the resolution 
of an issue in the tax proceeding; (3) if the third party's return or return 
information directly relates to a transactional relationship between the third party 
and the taxpayer whose liability is at issue and the third party's return or return 
information directly affects the resolution of an issue in the tax proceeding; and 
(4) if certain requirements are met in certain criminal proceedings. For additional 
information regarding disclosures under section 6103(h)(4), please see the 
Disclosure and Privacy Law Reference Guide, infra. 
that may constitute evidence of the commission of a Federal nontax crinie "to the 
extent necessary to apprise the head of the appropriate Federal agency charged 
with the responsibility of enforcing such law." I.R.C. § 61 03(i)(3)(A)(i) (emphasis 
added). Because the statutory text uses the word "apprise," the scope of return 
information disclosed under section 61 03(i)(3)(A) should be limited so as to only 
alert the Federal nontax criminal law enforcement agency about the possible 
existence of a nontax crime. 
Such disclosures are authorized regardless of whether the Service has 
concurrent jurisdiction over the crime. While the statute does not require that the 
return information be conclusive, the return information should sufficiently identify 
the specific criminal act to which it relates. 
The Service may not, however, disclose "taxpayer return information" to other 
Federal agencies for nontax crimes. Taxpayer return information is return 
information that is "filed with, or furnished to, the Secretary by or on behalf of the 
taxpayer to whom such return information relates." I.R.C. § 6103(b)(3). A Form 
W-2 is entirely taxpayer return information. The employer files it for his own 
liabilities, so it is his taxpayer return information. The employer files it on behalf 
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of the employee for the employee's liability, even if that employee is an 
undocumented worker. The employer also files it on behalf of the victim, and it 
will likely have an effect on the victim's liability. As a result, a Form W-2 (or 
similar document) is almost always taxpayer return information. 
Note, however, that if the Federal nontax criminal law enforcement agency 
decides to investigate the matter, it can seek the disclosure of returns and any 
additional return information (including any taxpayer return information) pursuant 
to sections 6103(i)(1) and (2).102 
8. The Service may only disclose return information to state and local 
officials if they are considered Federal employees for section 6103 
purposes. 
Generally speaking, there is no authority under the Code to disclose information 
to state and local law enforcement for nontax administration purposes. Cf. 
I.R.C. § 61 03(d). State and local law enforcement personnel, however, may be 
considered Federal employees for the purposes of section 6103 so long as they 
are formally appointed as Federal employees (rather than merely detailed), they 
are assisting in a Federal investigation, and are supervised by a Federal 
employee. 
It should be remembered that a taxpayer may always consent to the disclosure of 
his or her own return information under section 61 03(c). In the case of a victim of 
identity theft, the taxpayer could consent to the disclosure of his or her own tax 
return information to state and local law enforcement. The Service, however, 
would need to ensure that such a disclosure would not seriously impair Federal 
tax administration, as discussed below. Additionally, a copy of any consent 
should be retained for at least a three-year period. 
9. The Service may disclose information to confirm a return's legitimacy. 
The Service may disclose enough information necessary to determine whether a 
return is legitimate under section 61 03(k)(6). The Service must reasonably 
believe that the information is not otherwise available or doing so must be 
necessary to carry out the employee's official duties. Treas. Reg. § 
301.61 03(k)(6)-1 (a)(2). In the identity theft context, when an employer files a 
document, such as a W-2, that includes a stolen SSN, the Service may contact 
the employer to inform the employer that the SSN does not match. The Service 
102 Federal agencies may obtain tax information for use in nontax criminal investigations 
pursuant to an ex parte order of a federal district court judge or magistrate. I.R.C. § 
61 03(i)(1 ). Information obtained from a source other than the taxpayer or the taxpayer's 
representative may be disclosed in response to a written request from the head of a federal 
agency or its Inspector General or by certain designated Department of Justice employees. 
I.R.C. § 61 03(i)(2). For additional information regarding disclosures under section 61 03(i), 
please see the Disclosure and Privacy Law Reference Guide, supra. 
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must be cautious, however, in what exactly is revealed to the employer. The 
Service may inform the employer that the name and SSN do not match, but the 
Service may not inform the employer of the identity of the true owner of the SSN. 
Additionally, if the Service determines a mismatch between the name and other 
contact information on a return and the SSN on, for example, a Form W-2, then 
the Service may contact the employee to investigate the discrepancy. The 
Service should take care, however, not to disclose information related to the 
victim, including the victim's identity, to the employee. 
E. IMPAIRMENT AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Before disclosing any additional information, the Service should also consider the 
following issues. 
1 . Information from an identity theft return should not be disclosed if that 
information would seriously impair Federal tax administration. 
The Service must withhold information that would seriously impair tax 
administration, even if it would otherwise be eligible for disclosure under section 
6103, including certain third-party return information. See I.R.C. § 61 03(c), (e)(7). 
Once a potential identity theft has occurred, the Service should consider whether 
to withhold information, either through redaction or other means, regarding third-
party identity theft victims and other third parties if disclosing that information 
would seriously impair Federal tax administration. It is a business decision what 
information might need to be withheld based on the damage that might be done 
to tax administration if such information were disclosed. In determining whether 
to redact certain third-party information, the Service should consider Hodge, in 
which the court found that the name and address of a person who used plaintiff's 
SSN was third-party return information that could not be disclosed to the plaintiff. 
Hodge, supra. 
2. Victims may obtain copies of fraudulent returns. 
The Service has determined that a victim of identity theft may request a copy of a 
return that was filed using his or her own information, though it may be heavily 
redacted. Redactions will include many of the issues discussed in this 
memorandum. For example, in some cases, a fraudulent return may list multiple 
victims' information, and the Service should redact the other victims' return 
information before disclosing any of the victim's return information. For additional 
information, the victim should visit https://www.irs.gov/lndividuals/lnstructions-for-
Requesting-Copy-of-Fraudulent-Returns. 
Please call Joy Gerdy Zogby at (202)317-4927 if you have any further questions. 
33 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
